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INTRODUCTION
A dichotomy exists in the laws of Europe addressing the religious
freedom of Muslim women, particularly those interpreting the
guarantees of religious freedom under Article 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (Convention). 1 European and
international covenants, generally influenced by the postcolonial
sympathies of many United Nations member states, aim at protecting
the human rights of minorities. In contrast, some state domestic laws
may reflect a country's xenophobia toward minority groups. This
contrast is well illustrated by the ban on wearing the Islamic
headscarf, especially the burqa and niqab. 2 Since April 11, 2011,
when France became the first European country to ban the wearing of
the Muslim veil,3 followed by Belgium and Bulgaria, 4 twenty-one
European nations have enacted some form of partial or full restriction
on veiling by Muslim women. 5
Article 9 of the Convention guarantees the protection of religious
freedom. 6 Article 9 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” 7 An individual has the
*

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

Adjunct Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law;
Administrative Judge, Federal Aviation Administration; Elected Member, American
Law Institute; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to
thank Professor Corinna Barrett Lain, Richmond University School of Law, for her
invaluable insights and feedback.
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9,
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter Convention].
See Ronan McCrea, The Ban on the Veil and European Law, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
57, 91, 94 (2013).
Ralf Michaels, Banning Burqas: The Perspective of Postsecular Comparative Law, 28
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 213, 218 (2018). The law was passed on October 11, 2010,
but the ban was not formally enforced until April 11, 2011. See C.M.A. McCauliff,
Dreyfus, Laïcité and the Burqa, 28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 117, 140 (2012).
See Michaels, supra note 3, at 219–21.
Virginia Villa, Women in Many Countries Face Harassment for Clothing Deemed
Too Religious – or Too Secular, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://pewrsr.ch/3nqbvQJ [https://perma.cc/BM3B-7DR5] (finding that 21 out of 45
European countries had government restrictions on head coverings for women).
Convention, supra note 1.
Article 9 of the Convention provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
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right to worship and observance except where “prescribed by law and
. . . necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety,
for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 8 Notwithstanding
this language in Article 9, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) (and domestic courts of European Union member states)
upheld these veiling bans on the grounds that they are “necessary in a
democratic society.” 9
However, this interpretation of the Convention by European courts
has created an exception for religious observance, 10 specifically
where the wearing of the burqa, niqab, or hijab by Muslim women is
at issue. 11 While ostensibly balancing policies aimed at protecting
religious freedom in pluralist societies with religious expression, in
practice the ban amounts to a forced assimilation of Muslim
minorities.
This article will (1) provide an overview of the religious practice of
veiling and the sociological theory of “covering,” 12 (2) discuss the
controversy of European countries’ partial and full bans on the
practice of Muslim veiling, 13 and (3) argue that forced covering is
wrongful and constitutes a harmful suppression of religious
expression by Muslim women. 14
I.

TWO TYPES OF COVERING

A. The Religious Practice of Veiling by Muslim Women
Our examination of the European prohibitions against wearing the
burqa, niqab, or hijab must first begin with a look at the practice of

democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
E.g., S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, ¶ 158 (July 1, 2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145466 [https://perma.cc/V6AU-4JMM]. See
generally Michaels, supra note 3, at 222–23 (reviewing veiling bans in European
courts).
See, e.g., S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11, ¶ 151.
See, e.g., id.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
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veiling by women in Islam. The two most cited passages of the
Qur’an in support of veiling are 24:30-31 and 33:58-59:
The believing men are enjoined to lower their gaze and
conceal their genitals and the believing women are enjoined
to lower their gaze and conceal their genitals, draw their
headdress to cover their cleavage, and not to display their
beauty, except that which has to be revealed, except to their
husbands, their fathers, their husbands’ fathers, their sons,
their husbands’ sons, their brothers or their brothers’ sons,
or their sisters’ sons, or their women, or their slaves, or
eunuchs or children under age; and they should not strike
their feet to draw attention to their hidden beauty. O
Believers, turn to God, that you may know bliss. 15
And,
Those who harass believing men and believing women
undeservedly, bear (on themselves) a calumny and a
grievous sin. O Prophet! Enjoin your wives, your daughters,
and the wives of true believers that they should cast their
outer garments over their persons (when abroad): That is
most convenient, that they may be distinguished and not be
harassed. 16
The practice of veiling among most Muslim women emerged three
or four generations after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. 17 Veils
were initially worn to distinguish the wives of the Prophet. 18 Later,
women wore veils to signify membership in the upper class. 19 With
the Safavids in the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, the veil
consolidated as a symbol of social status, and later in the nineteenth
century a symbol of cultural identity. 20
Veiling here refers to a diversity of garments: the hijab, shayla,
khimar, chador, niqab, the burqa, abaya, and jibab. The hijab is a
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Qur’an 24:30–31.
Id. at 33:58–59.
JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT ISLAM 95 (1st ed. 2002).
Id. at 95–96.
Id.
See Ashraf Zahedi, Contested Meaning of the Veil and Political Ideologies of Iranian
Regimes, 3 J. MIDDLE E. WOMEN’S STUD. 75, 79–80 (describing the origin of veiling
as tied to social status until the sixteenth century when more women began the
practice); ESPOSITO, supra note 17, at 16 (discussing the importance of cultural
identity to Muslims during the nineteenth century).
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“square scarf that covers the head and neck but leaves the face
clear.” 21 In colloquial terms, a headscarf. Interestingly, the term hijab
is derived from the Arabic word meaning “cover.” 22
The shayla is “a long, rectangular scarf that is wrapped loosely
around the head and tucked or pinned at the shoulders” and “often
leaves the neck and face clear.” 23 The khimar is “a long, cape-like
scarf that is wrapped around the head and hangs to the middle of the
back.” 24 The chador is a full-body cloak that “is held in place under
the neck by hand.” 25
The niqab—the subject of most of the bans along with the burqa—
is “a face-covering that covers the mouth and nose, but leaves the
eyes clear.” 26 The burqa “covers the entire face [and body], with a
crocheted mesh grill over the eyes.” 27 The abaya, required in Saudi
Arabia, is “[t]ypically black . . . [and] constructed like a loose robe or
caftan and covers everything but the face, hands and feet.” 28 Finally,
the jilbab, which is discussed in the Qur’an, is a general reference to
“any head-to-toe style of modest dress, especially a head scarf.” 29
Women choose to wear the hijab as a sign of faith, modesty, or as a
matter of identity, both religious and cultural. 30 Others decline to
wear the veil citing other means of achieving modesty, and that the
public display of the veil in Western society, by drawing attention to
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

26.

27.
28.
29.
30.

Types of Islamic Veils, BARRINGTON STAGE CO., https://barringtonstageco.org/typesof-islamic-veils/ [https://perma.cc/TXY2-35X2] (last visited Aug. 30, 2021); see also
ESPOSITO, supra note 17, at 183 (defining the hijab as a “[v]eil covering the hair and
head of a Muslim woman”).
Hijab is the Arabic Term For “Cover”, ISLAMIC RSCH. FOUND. INT’L, INC.,
https://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_1451_1500/hijab__is_the_arabic_term_for_cove
r.htm [https://perma.cc/X46N-NLUZ] (last visited Aug. 30, 2021).
Islamic Position on Hijab, MUSLIM INSPIRE, https://musliminspire.com/islamicposition-on-hijab/ [https://perma.cc/3M59-DZC8] (last visited Aug. 30, 2021).
Id.
Russell Goldman, What’s That You’re Wearing? A Guide to Muslim Veils, N.Y.
TIMES (May 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/world/what-in-theworld/burqa-hijab-abaya-chador.html [https://perma.cc/ALY9-88XT]; Types of
Islamic Veils, supra note 21.
Islamic Position on Hijab, supra note 23; see Sigal Samuel, Banning Muslim Veils
Tends to Backfire—Why Do Countries Keep Doing It?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/denmark-burqa-veilban/566630/ [https://perma.cc/76G9-92CP].
Goldman, supra note 25 (alteration in original); see also ESPOSITO, supra note 17, at
182.
Goldman, supra note 25 (alteration in original).
Id.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 17, at 96–97.
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women, provides the opposite of the underlying rationale for wearing
the veil. 31
B. The Theory of “Covering”
Covering is a blending in phenomenon. Erving Goffman’s 1963
seminal work, Stigma, discusses this interrelationship between social
identity and society at large in the context of race, nationality, and
creed. 32 He defines a “stigma” as “the situation of the individual who
is disqualified from full social acceptance.” 33 A stigma is defined as
“a special kind of relationship between attribute and stereotype . . .
.” 34 He splits these into two categories: virtual social identity and
actual social identity. 35 Virtual social identity involves traits imputed
to the group, while actual social identity are traits actually
possessed. 36
If someone conforms with societal norms, they are defined as
“normals.” 37 This may lead those in society to “believe [a] person
with a stigma is not quite human.” 38 The self-awareness of difference
lends itself to “[s]hame” on the part of the individual. 39 Goffman
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.

Id. at 97 (“[Critics of Islamic dress] see such women as under the sway of an
oppressive patriarchal culture or just submitting to the dictates of their religion.”). For
a good discussion on this topic, see Samina Ali, What Does the Quran Really Say
(Feb. 10, 2017),
About a
Muslim
Woman’s
Hijab?, YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_J5bDhMP9lQ [https://perma.cc/6J9S-R2RT].
See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA (1963).
Id. at Preface.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 5.
Id. (“We construct a stigma-theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority and account
for the danger he represents . . . .”) (alteration in original). Goffman also describes a
contrary group of society he calls the “wise.” Id. at 28. Goffman defines them as
“persons who are normal but whose special situation has made them intimately privy
to the secret life of the stigmatized individual and sympathetic with it, and who find
themselves accorded a measure of acceptance, a measure of courtesy membership in
the clan.” Id.
Id. at 7 (alteration in original). Goffman specifically states:
[T]he standards he has incorporated from the wider society equip
him to be intimately alive to what others see as his failing,
inevitably causing him, if only for moments, to agree that he does
indeed fall short of what he really ought to be. Shame becomes a
central possibility, arising from the individual’s perception of one
of his own attributes as being a defiling thing to possess, and one
he can readily see himself as not possessing.
Id.
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further provides that the individual response may be an “attempt to
correct what he sees as the objective basis of his failing . . . .”40 The
individual may also avoid what Goffman calls “mixed contacts”—the
interaction between the “stigmatized” individual and “normal”
people. 41 This may also lead to attempts at “normification.”42
Goffman defines this as “the effort on the part of a stigmatized
individual to present himself as an ordinary person, although not
necessarily making a secret of his failing.” 43
“Social information” refers to information conveyed about an
individual. 44 This “information as well as the sign through which it is
conveyed, is reflexive and embodied; that is, it is conveyed by the
very person it is about, and conveyed through bodily expression in
the immediate presence of those who receive the expression.” 45
Social information is conveyed often through “symbols.” 46 These
symbols may be “prestige symbols” or “stigma symbols.” 47 Some
symbols “are not frankly presented as disclosures of stigma, but
purportedly attest rather to membership in organizations claimed to
have no such significance in themselves.” 48
“Disidentifiers” are positive or negative characteristics that “break
up an otherwise coherent picture . . . throwing severe doubts on the
validity of the virtual one.” 49 In other words, disidentifiers make it
hard to identify an individual as being from the stigmatized class. 50
Goffman refers to the presence of these disidentifiers as “passing.”51
Passing is “[w]here the stigma is nicely invisible and known only to
the person who possesses it, who tells no one . . . .” 52 However, an
individual who may otherwise “pass” as to their social identity, may
instead elect to disclose their identity by “voluntarily [wearing] a
stigma symbol, a highly visible sign that advertises his failing
wherever he goes.” 53
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 9 (alteration in original).
Id. at 12.
See id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 44 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 42, 73.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 100.
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“Passing” leads to “Covering.” 54 Covering is where “[t]he
individual’s object is to reduce tension, that is, to make it easier for
himself and the others to withdraw covert attention from the stigma,
and to sustain spontaneous involvement in the official content of the
interaction.” 55 In other words, covering encompasses techniques to
assimilate into normal society. 56 A challenge to covering is when “a
known-about attribute obtrudes itself into the center of attention, for
obtrusiveness increases the difficulty of maintaining easeful
inattention regarding the stigma.” 57
Kenji Yoshino eloquently defines what it means to “cover” in his
book, Covering 58: “Everyone covers. To cover is to tone down a
disfavored identity to fit into the mainstream. In our increasingly
diverse society, all of us are outside the mainstream in some way.
Nonetheless, being deemed mainstream is still often a necessity of
social life.” 59 Quoting Goffman’s book on managing “spoiled”
identities, he further describes those who cover as “‘persons who are
ready to admit possession of a stigma . . . [who] may nonetheless
make a great effort to keep the stigma from looming large’ . . .
covering pertains to its obtrusiveness.” 60 Conversion, 61 passing, and
covering 62 are all means by which those who are seen as outside
“normal” society seek to assimilate. 63
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 102.
Id.
Id. at 103.
Id.
KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING 79 (2006) (“[G]ays can cover along many axes . . . .
Appearance concerns how an individual physically presents herself to the world.
Affiliation concerns her cultural identifications. Activism concerns how much she
politicizes her identity. Association concerns her choice of fellow travelers . . . .”).
Yoshino’s book elaborates on the concept of “covering” within the context of
homosexuals in a mainstream heterosexual culture. See generally id. While not
directly on point with physical coverings like the hijab or burqa, Yoshino’s discussion
elaborates on Goffman’s Stigma and is closely analogous to the physical coverings of
Muslim women in traditionally non-Muslim societies. See generally id.; GOFFMAN,
supra note 32.
YOSHINO, supra note 58, at ix.
Id. at 18 (alteration in original).
Id. at 46 (defining “conversion” as “a spiritual transformation of our core”).
Id. at 79 (stating that “covering is a strategy of assimilation available to all groups”).
Id. at 21. Yoshino further states:
The selective uptake of gay culture . . . shows that acceptance is
driven by the desires of the straight cultural consumer rather than
the dignity of the gay person. It is natural for consumers to be
selective in their appropriation of minority cultures – they choose
the parts that are meaningful to them, and that give them pleasure
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In response to the practice of covering, he says that his “real
commitment is to autonomy – giving individuals the freedom to
elaborate their authentic selves.” 64 Yoshino elaborates that “we
should require . . . reason-forcing conversion, making the state or the
employer justify burdens placed on a protected group.” 65 The state or
employer can demand conformity so long as it backs the demand
with a reason rather than a bias. 66 However, “[p]ermitting the
preservation of a common culture to stand as a justification for
coerced covering would make the reason-forcing conversion
pointless, as demands for assimilation can always draw on that
justification.” 67
Yoshino concludes that “[a] useful lesson of the religious apparel
cases is that no one argues that the covering demand is trivial.” 68 He
sends forth a clarion call for further inquiry: “This is a covering
demand that requires uncovering.” 69 This article hopes to accomplish
this.
II. THE CONTROVERSY OF EUROPEAN PROHIBITIONS ON
VEILING
A. Legislative Prohibitions on Veiling
The guarantee of religious freedom is well established in both
international and European law. In April 2011, however, France
became the first European country to enact legal restriction on

and self-definition . . . True pluralism would be receptive to traits
valued by those who bear them, regardless of their mainstream
appeal.
64.
65.
66.
67.

68.
69.

Id. at 85.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id. at 179. Kenji Yoshino looks to the external pressures exerted on Muslim women to
refrain from wearing the burqa or hijab. Id. at 178–79. In a 2003 case, a Florida State
court barred a Muslim woman from wearing a veil in her drivers’ license photograph.
Id. at 178. The court’s rationale posited the state security interest in being able to
identify someone as a “compelling reason to justify that burden.” Id. In another 2003
case, a student in Oklahoma was suspended by her school for wearing a headscarf as a
violation of the dress code. Id. at 178–79. The case was settled the following year
with the U.S. Department of Justice. Id. at 179. The school’s dress code was changed
to reflect an exception for religious observance. Id.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 178.
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veiling. 70 That same year, Belgium enacted a law prohibiting “the
wearing of any clothing which totally or principally conceals the
face.” 71 On December 6, 2012, the Belgian Constitutional Court,
applying Article 9 of the Convention, upheld the ban, reasoning:
[T]he legislature sought to defend a societal model where
the individual took precedence over his philosophical,
cultural or religious ties, with a view to fostering integration
for all and to ensuring that citizens shared a common
heritage of fundamental values such as . . . the principle of
separation between church and State. 72
Problematically, even if the wearing of a veil or headscarf is a
voluntary act of religious observance, “the principle of gender
equality . . . justifies the opposition by the State.” 73
Taking the opposing view, the Council of the State of the
Netherlands rejected public restrictions on wearing the veil because
“it was not for the Government to exclude the choice of wearing the
burqa or niqab for religious reasons.” 74 In between these two rulings,
the Spanish Supreme Court upheld a local ordinance banning the
wearing of a veil and headscarf when seeking a reduced fare on
public transportation because the regulation “did not constitute a
restriction on fundamental rights.” 75
In 2017, following suit, Austria enacted a law prohibiting Muslim
women from publicly wearing full-face veils and imposing a fine of
150 euros. 76 The law applies to the niqab and the burqa with Muslim
headscarves still permitted. 77 The language was broadly drafted so as
not to appear to target Muslims.78 However, one of the consequences
of such a broadly worded measure was that a man dressed as Santa
Claus was publicly directed by the police to remove his hat and
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

77.
78.

S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, ¶ 41 (July 1, 2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145466 [https://perma.cc/V6AU-4JMM].
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 42.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 49, 51.
Id. ¶¶ 47–48.
Iain Burns, You’re Saint Nicked! Man is Ordered by Police to Remove Fake Father
Christmas Beard in Austria Under its Laws Banning the Burka, DAILY MAIL,
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5182895/Man-ordered-remove-Santabeard-violating-burqa-ban.html [https://perma.cc/M55W-652M] (Dec. 15, 2017, 7:59
AM).
Id.
Id.
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beard. 79 The rationale provided by the Austrian government behind
the law is the integration of Muslims into Austrian society. 80 One
member of the Social Democratic Party hailed it as “creating a
continuous integration concept for the first time.” 81 Support for the
proposal, however, was far from monolithic. 82 The measure faced
opposition from Austrian President Alexander Van Der Bellen and
was condemned by the Austrian Bar Board as violating “the
fundamental rights of the freedom of conscience and the freedom of
private life.” 83
B. State Cases Upholding Veiling Prohibitions
Article 9 of the Convention is the primary basis for challenging
European State laws banning the wearing of Islamic garb. 84 Domestic
courts and the European Court of Justice have wrestled with the
balance of protecting religious freedom and the bans on wearing the
Islamic veil imposed by Parliaments. 85 The veil has been legally
challenged in the context of educational institutions, employment
discrimination, and, finally, the French prohibition on wearing the
veil in public.86 This section will discuss how European State courts
and, ultimately, the ECHR have attempted to reach this balance.
1.

Education

The initial challenges to prohibitions against Muslim garb arose in
the context of schools and universities. In R v. Headteacher and
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
See generally Christian Bartlau, Austria’s Controversial ‘Burqa Ban,’ a Year On, DW
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/austrias-controversial-burqa-ban-a-year-on/a45719874 [https://perma.cc/R667-2YWP].
Pam Barker, ‘Enlightenment Values’ – Austria Enacts Anti-Burqa & Compulsory
Integration Law, EUR. RELOADED (June 11, 2017), https://www.europereloaded.com/
enlightenment-values-austria-enacts-anti-burqa-compulsory-integration-law/
[https://perma.cc/Z87Z-3T5V].
Id.
Dan Bilefsky & Victor Homola, Austrian Parliament Bans Full Facial Veils in
Public, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/world/
europe/austria-veil-ban-muslim.html [https://perma.cc/9NZL-DXFN].
Sarah H. Cleveland, Banning the Full-Face Veil: Freedom of Religion and Non–
Discrimination in the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human
Rights, 34 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 217, 218–20 (2020).
Id.
Id. at 224–26; see also Bill Chappell, Employers’ Hijab Ban Isn’t ‘Direct
Discrimination,’ European Court Says, NPR (Mar. 14, 2017, 10:27 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/14/520113736/employers-hijabban-isnt-direct-discrimination-european-court-says [https://perma.cc/8LZW-W59R].
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Governors of Denbigh High School, a United Kingdom case, a
student, “R,” was excluded from attending secondary school for
wearing full Islamic covering. 87 She challenged her exclusion under
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.88 The House
of Lords sidestepped the larger issue of wearing Islamic dress in state
schools, favoring a narrower disposition of the case at hand. 89
The school was co-educational for children aged 11 through 16,
79% of whom were Muslim. 90 The dress provided for an exception to
wear the shalwar kameeze (“a combination of the kameeze, a
sleeveless smock-like dress with a square neckline, revealing the
wearer’s collar and tie, with the shalwar, loose trousers, tapering at
the ankles.”). 91 The controversy arose when R elected to wear the
jilbab (“a long coat-like garment”) instead of the shalwar kameeze
because it concealed her body more. 92
Some parents were against allowing the wearing of the jilbab
because it would lead to the outward differentiation among Muslim
sects based on their dress. 93 The head of the school felt that holding
to the dress code was “necessary to promote inclusion and social
cohesion.” 94 Because the school would not admit R on the premises
dressed in a jilbab, she ceased to attend. 95 The school’s committee of
governors “urged [R] to return, or to seek a place at another
school.” 96 They even offered to facilitate the transfer. 97
The House of Lords applied Article 9 of the Convention on the
principle of the right to outward observance of religious belief. 98 The
Lords, however, held that “[t]he freedom of religion, as guaranteed
by Article 9, is not absolute.” 99 The Lords turned to the question of
“whether [R]’s freedom to manifest her belief by her dress was
subject to limitation [or interference under the exceptions listed in]

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

R v. Headteacher & Governors of Denbigh High Sch. [2006] UKHL 15, [1], [3]–[4]
(appeal taken from Eng.).
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 2 (“The House is not . . . invited to rule whether Islamic dress, or any feature of
Islamic dress, should or should not be permitted in the schools of this country.”).
Id. ¶¶ 3, 6.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 22 (alteration in original).
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Article 9(2), and whether [it] was justified.” 100 They reasoned that a
finding of interference by the state is based upon “the totality of the
circumstances.” 101
In the case of R, her family elected for her to go to a school outside
of her designated “catchment area.” 102 The school in question “went
to unusual lengths to inform parents of its uniform policy.” 103 R was
enrolled in the school for two years before asserting her right to wear
the jilbab. 104 There were also three schools she could attend that did
allow wearing of the jilbab, one of which she ultimately attended. 105
The Lords could not find interference by the state (it was deemed
“debatable”), so they proceeded to the issue of justification. 106 To be
justified under Article 9(2), the “interference must be (a) prescribed
by law and (b) necessary in a democratic society for a permissible
purpose . . . .” 107 The interference “must be directed to a legitimate
purpose and must be proportionate in scope and effect.” 108 The Lords
found that the school had statutory authority to establish a uniform
dress code. 109 The Lords noted, “The school did not reject [R]’s
request out of hand: it took advice, and was told that its existing
policy conformed with the requirements of mainstream Muslim
opinion.” 110 Based on those facts, the Lords concluded the actions of
the school were justified. 111
In a similar ruling, the European Court of Human Rights upheld a
university dress code restricting the wearing of the hijab as not
violating Article 9 of the Convention. 112 In August 1997, Leyla Sahin
was a fifth year medical student at the Cerrahpasa Faculty of

100. Id. ¶ 21 (alteration in original).
101. Id. (citing Kalac v. Turkey, (1997) 27 EHRR 552, ¶ 27 (“‘Article 9 does not protect
every act motivated or inspired by religion or belief’ and ‘an individual may need to
take his specific situation into account.’”)); see Ahmad v. United Kingdom, (1981) 4
EHRR 126, ¶ 11 (“[I]t may, as regards the modality of a particular religious
manifestation, be influenced by the situation of the person claiming that freedom.”).
102. See R v. Headteacher & Governors of Denbigh High Sch. [2006] UKHL at [25].
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. ¶ 26 (alteration in original).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶ 33 (alteration in original).
111. Id. ¶ 34.
112. Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, ¶ 17 (Nov. 10, 2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/fre?i=001-70956 [https://perma.cc/UN8F-63KR].
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Medicine at Istanbul University in Istanbul, Turkey. 113 She was from
an observant Muslim family, and wore the hijab for religious
reasons. 114 The University dress code provided that “students whose
‘heads are covered’ . . . and students . . . with beards must not be
admitted to lectures, courses or tutorials.” 115 These prohibitions were
consistent with transitional section 17 of Law no. 2547. 116
On March 12, 1998, Leyla Sahin was denied admission to her
exams by the invigilators because she was wearing the hijab.117
Subsequently, on March 20, 1998, she was also denied enrollment in
an orthopaedic traumatology class for wearing the hijab. 118 On April
16, 1998, she was again denied admission to a neurology lecture, and
then on June 10, 1998, her exam in the public health course.119
Finally, she was suspended from the University altogether under the
Students Disciplinary Procedure Rules. 120
The ECHR first observed that the Turkish Republic, founded in
1923, emphasized secularism (laik). 121 In reviewing Article 9 of the
Convention on whether interference if prescribed by law was
legitimate and “necessary in a democratic society,” 122 the Court
found that the exception to Article 9 for legitimate restrictions aimed
at protecting the freedom of others and public order, was not in
dispute. 123
The Court stated that Article 9 does not serve to “protect every act
motivated by a religion or belief” because “it may be necessary to
place restrictions on freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in
order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that
everyone’s beliefs are respected.” 124 The State is “the neutral and
impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and
beliefs,” and playing this part is “conducive to public order, religious
harmony and tolerance in a democratic society.” 125 In this role, the

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. ¶ 15.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16 (alteration in original).
Id. ¶ 40 (“Choice of dress shall be free in institutions of higher education, provided
that it does not contravene the laws in force.”).
Id. ¶ 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 24.
Id. ¶ 30.
Id. ¶ 75.
Id. ¶ 99.
Id. ¶¶ 105–06.
Id. ¶ 107.
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nation state may not “assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs.”126
The Court proceeded to reason that “democracy does not simply
mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance
must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of
people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant
position.” 127
The State seeking to strike a balance of the rights among
individuals serves as the basis of a “democratic society.” 128 With the
regulation of religious practices, “opinion in a democratic society
may reasonably differ widely, the role of the national decisionmaking body must be given special importance.” 129 The secularism
embodied in the Turkish Constitution is the “paramount
consideration underlying the ban on the wearing of religious symbols
in universities.” 130 Accordingly, the ECHR concluded that Article 9
of the Convention does not guarantee outward religious expression,
or “the right to disregard rules that have proved to be justified.” 131
2.

Employment

In Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, the European Court of
Justice upheld a veiling ban in the context of employment and
workplace discrimination. 132 The Court of Cassation, Belgium,
pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, which establishes jurisdiction, 133 requested a
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. ¶ 108.
Id.
Id. ¶ 109.
Id. ¶ 116.
Id. ¶ 121.
Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Sols. NV, ECLI:EU:C:2017:203, ¶ 44 (Mar.
14, 2017), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? docid=188852
&doclang=EN [https://perma.cc/CH4Y-7BLV].
133. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states:
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of the Treaties;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions,
bodies, offices or agencies of the Union;
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a
Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a
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preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice. 134 The
Belgium court sought an interpretation of Article 2(2)(a) of Council
Directive 2000/78/EC (November 27, 2000) on equal treatment in the
employment arena. 135
Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union provides that the EU
is “founded on principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.” 136 Protection
against discrimination is a universal right. 137 Articles 1 and 2 of the
Treaty establish “a general framework for combating discrimination
on the grounds of religion or belief . . . as regards employment and
occupation.” 138
G4S was a private company for receptionist services. 139 G4S had
an “unwritten rule” that employees could not wear political or
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give
judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a
court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there
is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal
shall bring the matter before the Court.
If such a question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State with regard to a person in custody, the
Court of Justice of the European Union shall act with the
minimum of delay.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
267, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.
Achbita, Case C-157/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:203, ¶ 1.
Id.
Council Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303) ¶ 1 (EC).
Id.
The purpose of the Directive is:
[T]o lay down a general framework for combating discrimination
on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
orientation as regards employment and occupation, with a view to
putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal
treatment.
....
For the purposes of this Directive, the ‘principle of equal
treatment’ shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect
discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds referred to in
Article 1.

Id. ch. I, art. 1–2 at 18.
139. Achbita, Case C-157/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:203, ¶ 10.
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religious garb at work. 140 On February 12, 2003, Achibita, a Muslim
woman, held a position as a receptionist with the company with an
“employment contract of indefinite duration.” 141 In April 2006,
Achibita told G4S that she intended to wear the hijab at work. 142 The
company responded negatively. 143 On May 29, 2006, G4S turned its
informal rule against religious symbolism into an established
employment rule. 144 Subsequently, on June 12, 2006, Achibita was
fired for her desire to wear the hijab at work. 145
The issue in the case was a prohibition enacted by G4S on its
employees to wear any outward religious symbols while at work.146
In other words, “whether the imposition of an internal prohibition
against the hijab by a private company constitutes direct
discrimination in violation of Article 2(2)(a) of the Directive.” 147 In
upholding the ban, the European Court of Justice found that:
Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as
meaning that the prohibition on wearing an Islamic
headscarf, which arises from an internal rule of a private
undertaking imposing a blanket ban on the visible wearing
of any political, philosophical or religious sign in the
workplace, does not constitute direct discrimination based
on religion or belief within the meaning of that directive. 148

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶¶ 7–17.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id. ¶¶ 19–20.
Id. ¶ 44.
By contrast, such an internal rule of a private undertaking may
constitute indirect discrimination . . . if it is established that the
apparently neutral obligation it imposes results, in fact, in persons
adhering to a particular religion or belief being put at a particular
disadvantage, unless it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim,
such as the pursuit by the employer, in its relations with its
customers, of a policy of political, philosophical and religious
neutrality, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate
and necessary, which it is for the referring court to ascertain.
Id.
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C. The French Full Ban on Veiling by Muslim Women
The most restrictive law against the practice of veiling by Muslim
women was promulgated by France. 149 France completely banned
wearing the veil in public under any circumstance. 150 In S.A.S. v.
France, the ECHR upheld the French ban on the wearing of Islamic
dress concealing the face. 151 This time in the broader context of
concealing the face in a public place pursuant to French Law No.
2010-1192 (October 11, 2010). 152 Law No. 2010-1192 provided that
“[n]o one may, in public places, wear clothing that is designed to
conceal the face.” 153 It further defined “public places” as “the public
highway and any places open to the public or assigned to a public
service.” 154
The
French
Constitution
Council
(Conseil
Constitutionnel) on October 7, 2010 (no. 2010-613 DC) upheld the
law. 155
“S.A.S.” was a French citizen and observant Muslim woman. 156
She sometimes wore the burqa and niqab, which cover the entire
body and face except for the eyes, in public.157 She voluntarily wore
it for religious beliefs and was not coerced in any way. 158 Moreover,

149. S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, ¶¶ 14, 28 (July 1, 2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145466 [https://perma.cc/V6AU-4JMM].
150. Id.
151. Id. ¶¶ 14, 28, 157–59.
152. Id.
153. Id. ¶ 28.
154. Id.
155. Id. ¶ 30.
The legislature was of the view that such practices might be
dangerous for public safety and fail to comply with the minimum
requirements of life in society. It also found that those women
who concealed their face, voluntarily or otherwise, were placed in
a situation of exclusion and inferiority that was patently
incompatible with the constitutional principles of liberty and
equality.
Id.
156. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
157. Id. ¶ 11.
158. Id. Article 225-4-10 of the French Criminal Code was also changed to address
situations involving coercion in wearing the Islamic veil: “[a]ny person who forces
one or more other persons to conceal their face, by threat, duress, coercion, abuse of
authority or of office, on account of their gender, shall be liable to imprisonment for
one year and a fine of 30,000 euros.” Id. ¶ 29. Stiffer penalties were provided in cases
involving a minor. Id.
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in her testimony, S.A.S. did not dispute that she should reveal her
face for security and identification purposes. 159
The ECHR concluded that Article 8 of the Convention embodied
the right to respect private life, and Article 9 implicated the right of
Muslim women to wear the burqa for religious reasons. 160 Because
wearing the burqa involved choices for appearances, it “relate[s] to
the expression of his or her personality and thus fall[s] within the
notion of private life.” 161 The question was one of “limitation” or
“interference,” S.A.S. could either wear the burqa to fulfill her
religious obligations or face criminal penalties. 162 The ECHR further
found that the measure was “prescribed by law” because it involved
sections 1–3 of the Law of 11 October 2010. 163 The Court accepted
that there was a legitimate concern of the French Parliament for
“public safety” under Articles 8 and 9. 164
The ECHR’s inquiry then turned to the idea that devout Muslim
women wearing the burqa is an “expression of a cultural identity
which contributes to the pluralism that is inherent in democracy.” 165
It observed the inherent contradiction that “a State Party cannot
invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice that is defended by
women.” 166 The “respect for human dignity cannot legitimately
justify a blanket ban on the wearing of the full-face veil in public
places,” even if “the clothing in question is perceived as strange by
many of those who observe it.” 167 However, the ECHR reasoned that:
[I]ndividuals who are present in places open to all may not
wish to see practices or attitudes developing there which
would fundamentally call into question the possibility of
open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an
established consensus, forms an indispensable element of
community life within the society in question. 168

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶¶ 35, 37.
Id. ¶ 107.
Id. ¶ 110.
Id. ¶¶ 111–12.
Id. ¶ 115.
Id. ¶ 120.
Id. ¶ 119.
Id. ¶ 120.
Id. ¶ 122.
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Thus, the issue was “[w]hether the measure is necessary in a
democratic society.” 169
Article 9 of the Convention guarantees the “freedom of thought,
conscience and religion” as one of the “foundations of a ‘democratic
society’ within the meaning of the Convention.” 170 That freedom
includes whether the individual does or does not want to hold or
observe a religious belief. 171 Finally, the ECHR held that Article 9
does not have absolute protections for every religious observance. 172
With respect to the limitations to the protections under Article 9,
the Court stated that “[i]n democratic societies, in which several
religions coexist within one and the same population, it may be
necessary to place limitations on freedom to manifest one’s religion
or beliefs in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and
ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.” 173 The State serves “as
the neutral and impartial organizer of the exercise of various
religions, faiths and beliefs, and has stated that this role is conducive
to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic
society.” 174 Therefore, the ECHR reasoned, the State must “ensure
mutual tolerance between opposing groups . . . .” 175
The ECHR stated that, “[D]emocracy does not simply mean that
the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be
achieved which ensures the fair treatment of people from minorities
and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.” 176 The ECHR further
urged a “dialogue and spirit of compromise.” 177 In other words, to
protect the freedoms of some under the Convention, the States may
need to restrict those of others. 178 Governments are in the best
position to make such determinations, and their decisions should be
given “special weight.” 179 Accordingly, under Article 9, “the State
should thus, in principle, be afforded a wide margin of appreciation
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id. ¶ 124; see Convention, supra note 1.
S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11, ¶ 124; see Convention, supra note 1, art. 9.
S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11, ¶ 125.
Id. ¶¶ 125–26.
Id. ¶ 127.
Id. ¶¶ 127–28 (citation omitted) (“Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are
hallmarks of a ‘democratic society.’”).
Id. ¶ 128.
Id.
Id. (“It is precisely this constant search for a balance between the fundamental rights
of each individual which constitutes the foundation of a democratic society.”).
Id. ¶ 129 (citing Maurice v. France, App. No. 11810/03, ¶ 117) (“[N]ational
authorities . . . are . . . better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs
and conditions.”).
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in deciding whether and to what extent a limitation of the right to
manifest one’s religion or beliefs is ‘necessary.’” 180
In the case of the law challenged by S.A.S., the ECHR reasoned
that “a State may find it essential to be able to identify individuals in
order to prevent danger for the safety of persons and property and to
combat identity fraud.” 181 However, public safety cannot solely
justify a blanket ban on clothing designed to conceal the face. 182 It
comes “within the powers of the State to secure the conditions
whereby individuals can live together in their diversity.” 183
The ECHR held that “the impugned ban can be regarded as
justified in its principle solely in so far as it seeks to guarantee the
conditions of ‘living together.’” 184 There were approximately 1,900
women wearing the full-face veil in France in 2009. 185 The ECHR
observed that “the women concerned may perceive the ban as a threat
to their identity.” 186 However, the ECHR further found it significant
“that the ban is not expressly based on the religious connotation of
the clothing in question but solely on the fact that it conceals the
face.” 187 The prohibition “can be regarded as proportionate to the aim
pursued, namely the preservation of the conditions of ‘living
together’ as an element of the ‘protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.’” 188 Accordingly, the ECHR concluded, the French ban on
wearing the full-face veil in public did not violate Articles 8 or 9 of
the Convention. 189

180. Id.
181. Id. ¶ 139.
182. Id. (The court took the view that “a blanket ban on the wearing in public places of
clothing designed to conceal the face can be regarded as proportionate only in a
context where there is a general threat to public safety.”).
183. Id. ¶ 141.
184. Id. ¶ 142.
185. Id. ¶ 145.
186. Id. ¶ 146.
187. Id. ¶ 151.
188. Id. ¶ 157.
189. Id. ¶ 159.
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III. EUROPEAN PROHIBITIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF
VEILING CONSTITUTE THE FORCED COVERING OF
MUSLIM WOMEN
A. European Courts’ Upholding of Veiling Bans is Harmful Forced
Covering
Covering involves an election by the individual to remove societal
stigma. 190 In other words, to be identified with “normal” society,
individuals must overcome the societal prejudices that lead the
stigmatized class to appear less than human. 191 A sense of selfawareness of difference leads the individual to cover. 192 It is a
personal desire on the part of the outsider to assimilate into the host
society. 193 As stated by Kenji Yoshino, covering is a means to joining
mainstream society. 194
As mentioned previously, Erving Goffman writes that one of the
reasons individuals cover is to avoid “mixed contacts” and allow “a
stigmatized individual to present himself as an ordinary person . . .
.” 195 In the case of the French law, it is a regulation of the encounters
between observant Muslim woman and French, secular society. 196
The veil is “‘a practice at odds with the values of the Republic’ as
expressed in the maxim ‘liberty, equality, fraternity.’” 197 It is
“incompatible with secular French society,” and “a flagrant
infringement of the French principle of living together (le ‘vivre
ensemble’).” 198 In the terms discussed in Goffman’s Stigma, the veil
is “stigmatized” whereas French democratic principles are
“normal.” 199
However, the voluntary wearing of the hijab or burqa by observant
Muslim women in Europe does not indicate a desire by an individual
to blend into society. Rather, it is an affirmation of individual identity
through the outward observance of religious belief; prohibitions on
these outward observances are state-enforced covering. 200 It is the
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

GOFFMAN, supra note 32, at 102.
Id. at 102–03.
Id.
Id. at 103.
See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
See GOFFMAN, supra note 32, at 12; see supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, ¶¶ 16–17 (July 1, 2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145466 [https://perma.cc/V6AU-4JMM].
Id. ¶ 17 (quotation in original).
Id.
See GOFFMAN, supra note 32, at 12.
See Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Sols. NV, ECLI:EU:C:2017:203 (Mar. 14,
2017),
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European State that sees them as “stigmatized.” 201 These countries
have sought through legislation to direct Muslim women’s
assimilation into “normal” society, such that the societal stigma
becomes the veil.
Some of the cases discussed earlier in this article dealt with limited
circumstances of dress codes in schools and employment. 202 These
cases challenged the rules of general applicability that infringed on
religious expression. 203 Some upheld and some struck down by the
reviewing courts. 204
Notwithstanding its limited scope, the reasoning of the ECHR in
Leyla Sahin v. Turkey sounds like covering. 205 The ECHR
emphasized that it is incumbent upon the nation-state to be “the
neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions,
faiths and beliefs” to provide “public order, religious harmony and
tolerance in a democratic society.” 206 While the nation does not
“assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs,” it strives to balance the
rights of individuals when it comes to religious practice. 207 In Sahin,
the ECHR sought to uphold Turkish secularism. 208 In other words, by
covering observant Muslim women, they became part of mainstream
(secular) Turkish society.
Indeed, with respect to the limitations to the protections under
Article 9 of the Convention, the ECHR stated that “[i]n democratic
societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same
population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on freedom to
manifest one’s religion or beliefs in order to reconcile the interests of
the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are
respected.” 209 The State serves “as the neutral and impartial organiser
of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, and has stated
that this role is conducive to public order, religious harmony and

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=188852&doclang=EN
[https://perma.cc/CH4Y-7BLV]; Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 (Nov. 10,
2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-70956 [https://perma.cc/UN8F-63KR]; R
v. Headteacher & Governors of Denbigh High Sch. [2006] UKHL 15 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
See cases cited supra note 200.
See cases cited supra note 200.
See cases cited supra note 200.
See cases cited supra note 200.
See Sahin, App. No. 44774/98, ¶¶ 106–08.
Id. ¶ 107.
Id.
See id. ¶ 116.
Id. ¶ 106 (citations omitted).
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tolerance in a democratic society.” 210 Therefore the State must
“ensure mutual tolerance between opposing groups . . . to ensure that
the competing groups tolerate each other.” 211 Importantly, as
expressed by the dissenting opinion in S.A.S. v. France, this view is
not monolithic. 212
Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom filed a dissenting opinion in
S.A.S., stating that the holding of the Court “sacrifices concrete
individual rights guaranteed by the Convention to abstract
principles.” 213 The dissent observed that “fears and feelings of
uneasiness [associated with the Muslim veil] are not so much caused
by the veil itself . . . but by the philosophy that is presumed linked to
it.” 214 There is “no right [under the Convention] not to be shocked or
provoked by different models of cultural or religious identity.” 215 The
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention include those exercised that
“offend, shock or disturb.” 216 The French concept of “living
together” cannot be used as the basis to justify “that human
interaction is impossible if the full face is not shown.” 217
Accordingly, the judges argued that the Law violates Articles 8 and 9
of the Convention because “the French legislature [] restricted
pluralism, since the measure prevents certain women from expressing
their personality and their beliefs by wearing the full-face veil in
public.” 218 They refer to this as “selective pluralism and restricted
tolerance.” 219
The idea that the French concept of “living together” is no more
than a cover is supported by the domestic debates over the law,
which divided France. The explanatory memorandum of the French
Law of October 11, 2010, (“prohibiting the concealment of one’s
210. Id. ¶ 107.
211. Id. ¶¶ 107–08 (“Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a
‘democratic society.’”).
212. See S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, ¶¶ 1–26 (July 1, 2014) (Nussberger, J. and
Jaderblom,
J.,
dissenting),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145466
[https://perma.cc/V6AU-4JMM].
213. Id. ¶¶ 2, 5 (“The very general concept of ‘living together’ does not fall directly under
any of the rights and freedoms guaranteed within the Convention.”).
214. Id. ¶ 6.
215. Id. ¶¶ 7–8 (alteration in original) (“[I]t can hardly be argued that an individual has a
right to enter into contact with other people, in public places, against their will.”).
216. Id. ¶ 7 (quoting Mouvement raelien suisse v. Switzerland, App. No. 16354/06, ¶ 48
(July 12, 2012)).
217. Id. ¶¶ 9, 13 (“[I]t is all the more difficult to argue that the rights protected outweigh
the rights infringed.”).
218. Id. ¶ 14.
219. Id.
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face in public places”) 220 emphasized the values of the French
Republic as the reason for banning the veil. 221 The Prime Minister’s
Circular of March 2, 2011, implementing Law no. 2010-1192
(October 11, 2010), provided that the law was specifically aimed at
the wearing of the burqa and niqab by Muslim women. 222 The
Parliamentary Commission report on the “wearing of the full-face
veil on national territory” found that the instances of Muslim women
wearing the burqa and niqab increased at the millennium.223 The
French Government was openly concerned with Islamic
extremism. 224
The French opposition was equally clear. On January 21, 2010, the
National Advisory Commission on Human Rights (Commission
nationale consultative des droits de l’homme – CNCDH) issued an
opinion against the proposed law banning the wearing of the burqa
and niqab in public. 225 The Commission stated that “the principle of
secularism alone could not serve as a basis for such a general
measure, since it was not for the State to determine whether or not a
given matter fell within the realm of religion, and that public order
could justify a prohibition only if it were limited in space and
time.” 226 Using language that the Commission could have taken right
out of Goffman’s work, the Commission stated the proposed law
posed a “risk of stigmatising Muslims.” 227
On January 29, 2010, the Conseil d’Etat also came out against the
proposed ban. 228 The Conseil issued a study on “the legal grounds for
a ban on the full veil.” 229 They “questioned the legal and practical
viability” of banning the burqa and niqab in light of “rights and
religious freedoms guaranteed by the [French] Constitution, the
[European] Convention [on Human Rights,] and European Union
220. Id. ¶¶ 14, 25 (majority opinion).
221. Id. ¶¶ 15–29.
222. See Law No. 2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010, J.O., Oct 12, 2010, p. 1. “The concealment
of the face in public places is prohibited from 11 April 2011 throughout the territory
of the Republic.” S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11, ¶ 31. “The offence is constituted when a
person wears an item of clothing that is designed to conceal his or her face and when
he or she is in a public place.” Id. The prohibition includes specifically the burqa and
niqab. See id.
223. S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11, ¶¶ 15–16.
224. Id. ¶ 16.
225. Id. ¶¶18–19.
226. Id. ¶ 18.
227. Id.
228. See id. ¶¶ 20–23.
229. Id. ¶ 20.
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law.” 230 The Conseil asserted that, “[T]he principle of gender
equality was not intended to be applicable to the individual person . .
. .” 231
The Conseil d’Etat did, however, support limited legislation more
narrowly tailored to limiting the wearing of the burqa and niqab only
for purposes of identification for public safety or “where
identification appeared necessary for access to or movement within
certain places.” 232 They also endorsed “strengthening enforcement”
against coercive measures to force women to wear the full-faced veil
against their will. 233
Despite the divided domestic opinion, when the issue arose in
S.A.S., the ECHR upheld the French ban along the same lines as the
narrower Turkish prohibition in Sahin. The Court endorsed the
French concept of “living together” (covering). 234 The ECHR
attempted to balance religion with “the preservation of the conditions
of ‘living together.’” 235 In other words, the mainstreaming of Muslim
women into European society through the absence of the veil.
B. Permissible Covering when Religious Observance Balanced with
Safety
There is an appropriate place for forced covering when it comes to
religious symbols; those limited exceptions include where a job
raises safety issues. 236 Most cases considering this issue, however,
conclude that the harm of suppressing religious freedom outweighs
the perceived societal benefit, at least where there are no physical
safety issues. 237 Indeed, it is actually worse where, as in the case of
France, an entire class of religious observance is suppressed for the
general idea of “living together.” 238

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

237.
238.

Id. ¶ 22.
Id.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 141–42 (“[T]he impugned ban can be regarded as justified in its principle solely
in so far as it seeks to guarantee the conditions of ‘living together.’”).
Id. ¶ 157.
See, e.g., Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and
36516/10, ¶¶ 19–20, 99–100 (Jan. 15, 2013) (exemplifying a situation where forced
covering
qualifies
as
an
exception
for
job
safety
reasons),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115881 [https://perma.cc/U9AR-QQ98].
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 91, 94–95.
S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11, ¶¶ 4–5 (dissenting opinion) (“The very general concept of
‘living together’ does not fall directly under any of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed within the Convention.”).

2021]

Lifting the Veil by Covering It

99

The ECHR has heard multiple cases involving the wearing of
religious garb. 239 Its jurisprudence related to other forms of religious
observance support the idea that the prohibition against wearing the
Muslim veil is forced covering. 240 Case law demonstrates that there is
a proper place for covering religious symbols if there are safety
issues. 241 Most cases, however, still consider the harm of suppressing
religious freedom. 242 Where there is no physical safety at issue, the
regulation is considered worse than the harm to religious freedom. 243
In Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom, the ECHR struck down
a workplace restriction on wearing the Christian cross as a violation
of Article 9 of the Convention. 244 In the case of Eweida, a devout
Coptic Christian challenged a policy of her employer, British
Airways, that prohibited her from openly wearing a cross. 245 On May
20, 2006, Eweida began visibly wearing a cross at work as a sign of
devotion. 246 British Airway’s policy was that accessories worn for
“mandatory religious reasons should at all times be covered up by the
uniform.” 247 Interestingly, a Muslim employee was allowed to wear
the hijab if it was in British Airways colors. 248 Accordingly, the
Court found the prohibition by British Airways to be a violation of
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.249
The issue was “whether Ms. Eweida’s right freely to manifest her
religion was sufficiently secured within the domestic legal order and
whether a fair balance was struck between her rights and those of
others.” 250 In the case of visibly wearing a cross, British Airways did
not strike a fair balance. 251 Her wearing the crucifix was a
239. See Eweida, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, ¶¶ 12, 20, 94–
95; S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11 ¶¶ 3, 11–14.
240. See generally Overview of the Court’s Case-law on Freedom of Religion, Eur. Ct.
Hum. Rts. (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/research_
report_religion_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ2S-U8U3] (examining the legal
standards on freedom of religion and discussing relevant cases enforcing these
principles).
241. See, e.g., Eweida, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, ¶¶ 19–20,
99–100.
242. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 41, 48–49, 63, 66, 72, 79, 81, 91, 94–95.
243. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 79–84, 89–110.
244. See id. ¶¶ 96–101.
245. Id. ¶¶ 93–95.
246. Id. ¶ 12.
247. Id. ¶ 10.
248. Id. ¶ 11.
249. See id. ¶¶ 94–95.
250. Id. ¶ 91.
251. Id. ¶ 94.
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fundamental right “because a healthy democratic society needs to
tolerate and sustain pluralism and diversity[.]” 252 There is “value to
an individual who has made religion a central tenet of his or her life
to be able to communicate that belief to others.” 253
The Court further observed that “[r]eligious freedom is primarily a
matter of individual thought and conscience.” 254 Article 9 guarantees
the protection “to manifest one’s belief . . . to practice in community
with others and in public.” 255 To constitute manifestation of one’s
religion the act must be “intimately linked to the religion or
belief.” 256 Eweida wore the cross as a sign of devotion. 257 The fact
that British Airways would not provide reasonable accommodation to
allow her to wear a cross constituted interference with her “right to
manifest her religion.” 258 The ECHR found that the British courts
gave too much deference to British Airways’ desire to project a
certain corporate image. 259 It further noted that British Airways’
subsequently changing its policy to allow the wearing of religious
articles was evidence that the “prohibition was not of crucial
importance.” 260
In contrast to Eweida, in the same consolidated opinion, the Court
upheld a prohibition of medical staff wearing jewelry in the operating
room. 261 Chapin was a nurse at a state hospital with a policy that
religious jewelry may be discreetly worn. 262 The hospital’s policy
further required that a supervisor could not unreasonably bar visibly
wearing religious symbols. 263 Chapin “believe[d] that to remove the
cross would be a violation of her faith.” 264
The record in this case, however, showed that the interference by
the state institution was necessary “to protect the health and safety of
nurses and patients.” 265 Dangling necklaces could pose a threat to
patients undergoing surgery. 266 Accordingly, the ECHR concluded
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 80.
Id.
Id. ¶ 82.
See id. ¶¶ 82, 94.
Id. ¶ 91.
See id. ¶¶ 94–95.
Id. ¶ 94.
Id. ¶¶ 98–100.
Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 98.
See id.
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that hospital administrators must be granted deference to their policy
to ensure the safety of patients. 267 In other words, the restriction was
for permissible reasons of safety, not to suppress religious
observance. 268 Accordingly, they found no violation of Article 9. 269
CONCLUSION
Pulling back the veil of the European laws, generally, and the
French law, specifically, we see that the underlying reasoning behind
the bans of wearing the Muslim veil constitute State-sponsored
covering of Muslim women. In Eweida, the ECHR appeared to adopt
a more balanced and nuanced approach to outward expressions of
Christianity. 270 However, despite this approach, the implications of
State-forced covering extends to all religious practice. 271 The
reasoning of the ECHR in upholding the ban applies to any form of
outward religious expression, and is not limited to displays of
Christian symbols. For example, the reasoning in Eweida could also
be applied to the practices of Orthodox Judaism or Ash Wednesday
observance for Roman Catholics. 272 When applying this reasoning to
other circumstances, it becomes clear that the religious freedom
guarantee under Article 9 of the ECHR becomes swallowed by the
Court’s exception. 273
While Article 9 of the Convention provides for limited exceptions:
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others. 274
Veiling is a visible form of religious expression practiced by minority
populations throughout the EU. 275 Thus, blanket bans on public
religious expression may improperly expand the Convention’s
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. ¶¶ 99–100.
Id. ¶ 100.
Id.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.B.
See generally GOFFMAN, supra note 32 (discussing stigmas associated with different
religious and ethnic groups and their forms of expression).
273. See supra Section III.B.
274. Convention, supra note 1; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Section I.A.
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narrow exception. In doing so, the blanket bans subsume the
protection sought by Article 9. 276

276. Compare supra Section III.A. (explaining the generalized application of the exception
in the public context), with supra Section III.B. (explaining the more realistic
application of the exception in private contexts).

